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FDA APPROVED? A CRITIQUE OF THE ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION INDUSTRY IN
THE UNITED STATES
Karen M. Ginsberg*
Artificial insemination by donor is becoming an increasingly
popular means to achieving parenthood. While the majority of
couples use artificial insemination to overcome fertility problems,
many recipients use artificial insemination to avoid passing a
genetic disease to their children. However, case studies reveal the
inherent dangers of artificial insemination, namely the lack of
proper screening methods to avoid passing genetic diseases to
children born by artificial insemination. State-by-state regula-
tion, federal guidelines, and private adjudication have all proven
to be inadequate methods of regulating the artificial insemination
industry. Ginsberg proposes federal regulation as the only means
of achieving a safe artificial insemination industry. The proposed
federal regulation would include better genetic screening, a more
efficient national sperm donor system, and limited disclosure to
recipients of artificial insemination and their children. These
measures would help to ensure that couples using artificial in-
semination get what they expect-healthy sperm, a safe artificial
insemination process, and ultimately, a healthy child.
Mr. "Orange/Red" is .. .a "graduate student involved in
genetic research," a fair-skinned, golden-blond, 6-foot-4,
225-pound man with Austrian ancestry. "Very handsome;
superb physique; warm; happy; confident. .. ." He enjoys
martial arts and Ping-Pong, plays the piano proficiently
and "comes from a long line of talented professional indi-
viduals and has the energy and ambition to match his
exceptional gifts."'
-Adapted from a California sperm donor catalog.
Described as "a brave and booming new world of baby-
making,"2 artificial reproductive technologies open doors for
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform,
Volume 30, 1997. B.A. 1993, Duke University; J.D. 1997, University of Michigan
Law School. I would like to thank Professor Sonia Suter for her assistance through-
out the note-writing process.
1. Tom Gorman, Measure of Success Elusive for Sperm Bank, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
12, 1992, at B1.
2. Liz Willen, Motherhood Sans Dad-A New Baby Boom: Donor Insemination
Gets More Popular-and Personal, NEWSDAY, Aug. 5, 1993, at 15.
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men and women who previously were unable to start families
of their own.3 A 1988 congressional report announced that
between two and three million American couples require
medical reproductive assistance. 4 More than 45,000 obstetri-
cian-gynecologists (OB-GYNs), general and family practitio-
ners, urologists, and surgeons perform artificial insemination
(AI),5 yet few regulations currently exist to ensure the quality
and safety of assisted reproduction. Organizations such as
the American Fertility Society and the American Association
of Tissue Banks have published professional guidelines for
biological and genetic screening of donor semen.6 However,
these organizations lack established mechanisms to police
compliance with these guidelines,7 and therefore, artificial
insemination practitioners and sperm banks do not regularly
follow them.' In response to this problem, then-Senator Al
Gore announced in 1988 that if the FDA did not take steps to
regulate the screening and testing of donor semen, Congress
would take appropriate action.9 He recommended the estab-
lishment of a national data bank on semen donors.'0 Gore
stated that the federal government has the authority to de-
velop and enforce a mandatory donor screening system, and
he envisioned a collaboration between physicians and govern-
ment agencies for the development of quality standards.1
However, no congressional action has yet been taken. 2
This Note discusses the trends in the regulation of current
assisted reproduction technologies, focusing on the artificial
insemination by donor (AI) practices of private physicians
and sperm banks. Part I describes the practice of AI and
3. See id.
4. See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFERTILITY: MEDICAL & SOCIAL
CHOICES, OTA-BA-358, at 3 (1988) [hereinafter INFERTILITY CHOICES]. Although artifi-
cial insemination by donor (Al) is but one of many forms of assisted reproduction,
this Note will deal solely with the players in the AI industry, AI practitioners and
sperm banks.
5. See id. at 6.
6. See American Fertility Soc'y, New Guidelines for the Use of Semen Donor
Insemination: 1990, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY Supp. 1 (Mar. 1990).
7. See Kerry Cork, Comment, Test-Tube Parents: Collaborative Reproduction
in Minnesota, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1535, 1537 & n.13 (1996).
8. See discussion infra Part III.A.
9. See Charles Marwick, Artificial Insemination Faces Regulation, Testing of
Donor Semen, Other Measures, 260 JAMA 1339, 1339 (1988). In addition, Represen-
tative Ron Wyden has underscored the need to introduce mandatory genetic testing
regulations into the artificial insemination industry. See 137 CONG. REC. E4145-46
(1991) (statement of Rep. Wyden).
10. See Marwick, supra note 9, at 1339.
11. See id.
12. See discussion infra Part III.C.
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discusses the factors that lead men and women to seek repro-
ductive assistance. This section focuses primarily on how
developments in genetic screening have affected the pool of
AI recipients. Part II explains the medical studies, govern-
mental reports, and current litigation that expose the need
for increased regulation of artificial insemination in the
United States. Part III discusses the current federal, state,
and industry regulation of AI practices in both the private
physician and sperm bank setting, and this regulation's
failure to respond to the problems documented in Part II.
Finally, Part IV recommends a plan for reshaping the
structure of artificial insemination practices to follow through
on Vice President Gore's 1988 recommendation for a
cooperative national sperm donor system monitored by the
federal government.
This Note proposes that the federal government establish a
national system of cooperative sperm donation facilities
spread throughout the country. Each donation facility should
register with and fall under the control of the FDA in order
to provide regulation and enforcement that the current AI
industry lacks. The FDA, with the assistance of the American
Fertility Society and private physicians, should establish
-and continually update--concrete donor screening regu-
lations for sperm banks to follow in every state. Finally, this
Note recommends relaxing donor/recipient anonymity stan-
dards, thereby encouraging more extensive record keeping of
AI procedures and increasing disclosure of non-identifying
donor/recipient information. Although this Note refers to
current screening practices for both infectious and genetic
diseases in donor sperm, it focuses primarily on remedying
the inadequacies in genetic screening practices.
I. A THUMBNAIL SKETCH OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
BY DONOR
A. Understanding Artificial Insemination
The most commonly used artificial reproductive technique
is AI, 13 in which sperm from a donor is used to inseminate a
13. See Judith Lynn Bick Rice, The Need for Statutes Regulating Artificial
Insemination by Donors, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 1055, 1055 (1985); Hollace S.W. Swanson,
Donor Anonymity In Artificial Insemination: Is It Still Necessary?, 27 COLUM. J.L. &
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woman on her expected date of ovulation to facilitate concep-
tion.'4 The donor generally remains anonymous and receives
compensation for his services.' 5 The first documented case of
human artificial insemination in the United States occurred
in 1866.16 By 1941, approximately 10,000 births resulted from
this technique. 17 Between 1941 and 1963, approximately
1,000 to 1,200 children were conceived annually through AI.'
The first commercial sperm bank opened its doors in 1970.'9
By 1987, at least 11,000 physicians were performing AI,20
using donors from more than 400 sperm banks. 2' By 1993,
more than 80,000 women were undergoing AI each year,
resulting in the conception of more than 30,000 babies.22 In
an industry now generating $164 million a year,23 AI practi-
tioners and recipients no longer face the stigma that formerly
accompanied the procedure.24
SOC. PROBS. 151, 152 (1993). Additional methods of artificial reproduction include
surrogate motherhood (in which a woman, after artificial insemination, carries the
child to term for the sperm donor and his wife), in vitro fertilization (in which the
egg is fertilized in a culture dish and implanted in the woman's uterus), and embryo
or ovum transfer (in which the egg is fertilized in the donor and transferred to the
prospective mother's uterus). See Rice, supra, at 1055.
14. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 151-52.
15. See id. at 154 n.2.
16. See Brent J. Jensen, Comment, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1982
BYU L. REv. 935, 938.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Mark S. Frankel, Human-Semen Banking: Social and Public Policy
Issues, 1 MAN & MED. 289, 289 (1976).
20. See US. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE
IN THE U.S., OTA-BP-BA-48, at 8 (1988) [hereinafter ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRAC-
TICE]. This report compiled the results of a 1987 survey of physician and sperm bank
practices of artificial insemination. Participating in the study were 1,558 physicians
and 15 U.S. commercial sperm banks. See id. at 3.
21. See Judith Gaines, A Scandal of Artificial Insemination, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
1990, § 6 (Magazine), at 23.
22. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 152.
23. See Gaines, supra note 21, at 23.
24. See R. SNOWDEN & G.D. MITcHELL, THE ARTIFICIAL FAMILY: A CONSIDERATION OF
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY DONOR 19 (1981) (discussing the stigma surrounding Al);
see also Swanson, supra note 13, at 154. Because societal attitudes regarding the
"traditional family unit" have undergone remarkable changes within the past 20
years, societal disapproval does not pose a large obstacle to couples seeking AL. See
id. at 168-71.
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B. Factors Necessitating Medical
Reproductive Assistance
AI enables many women to conceive a child where either
medical or social obstacles ordinarily would bar this opportu-
nity. A 1988 congressional report documents many of the
obstacles to natural conception, citing male partner infertility
as the impetus for eight out of ten requests for artificial
insemination.25 Other problems included male impotence
(3%), genetic disorders (3%), exposure to mutagens (0.4%),
and sexually transmitted diseases (0.2%).26 Fewer than four
percent of the women accepted as patients requested AI to
compensate for the absence of a male partner, and none of
the responding physicians performed AI in response to pa-
tient requests to conceive children with desired characteris-
tics, such as a specific intelligence level or the ability to play
basketball.2?
Although the 1987 study cited a very small percentage of
couples seeking Al to combat the risk of genetic disorders,2"
this percentage likely will increase with continued advance-
ments in the field of genetic technology, which will permit
more accurate diagnosis of genetic reproductive obstacles.29
For these couples, one or both partners may carry a genetic
25. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 23.
26. See id.
27. See id. However, it is possible that more single women seek Al than the
1988 OTA report indicates. The sample of doctors who chose to respond to the
survey may have influenced the results of the report. In comparison, Curie-Cohen's
well-documented 1979 study found that providing natural children to single moth-
ers was the third most common incentive for AI (cited by 9.5 percent of respon-
dents). See Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by
Donor in the United States, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 585, 585 (1979). See infra Part
II.A for a more detailed discussion of Curie-Cohen's study.
28. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 23 (noting that only
three percent cited risk of genetic disorders as the reason for seeking A).
29. See THADDEUS E. KELLY, CLINICAL GENETICS AND GENETIC COUNSELING 1 (2d ed.
1986). Couples facing a strong likelihood of transmitting a genetic disorder to the
fetus may choose to accept the risk of natural pregnancy, to adopt children, to seek
artificial insemination or ovum donation, to have prenatal testing with the option to
abort if the fetus manifests a genetic disorder, or to abstain from parenting alto-
gether. See id. at 353-55. However, adoption grows increasingly difficult as fewer
children are available for adoption. This decrease in availability may be due to the
greater accessibility of abortion and to changes in societal attitudes toward unwed
mothers. See Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin
Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L. REV. 1641, 1641-42 (1984).
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disorder, and may choose to undergo AI rather than risk
transmitting the disorder to the child.30 According to a 1979
study, the leading genetic disorders that induce couples to
seek AI are, in descending order of prevalence, Rh-factor in-
compatibility, cystic fibrosis, diabetes, hemophilia,
Huntington's disease, muscular dystrophy, and Tay-Sachs
disease.3 ' As scientists discover additional links between dis-
eases and specific genes (allowing for genetic testing for such
diseases), and as genetic science gains more acceptance in the
general community, it is probable that more couples will seek
Al as an alternative to natural conception in order to pre-
serve a genetic link to the natural mother 32 while decreasing
the likelihood that the child will inherit a genetic disorder.
Because of this potential trend, the medical profession should
provide a safe reproductive alternative for couples with
harmful genetic markers by screening potential sperm donors
for genetic disorders.
C. Abuses in the Current Artificial
Insemination Industry
The rarity of litigation over unsafe artificial insemination
techniques33 should not give potential Al candidates a false
sense of security about the quality of the procedure nation-
wide; rather, the lack of precedent may stem from the fact
that most of these cases are resolved in hushed, out-of-court
settlements intended to conceal the risks of AI from the pub-
lic. 34 Three such examples, the Skolnick case, the Jacobson
case, and the Cook case, reveal the true victims of the
30. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 153.
31. See Curie-Cohen, supra note 27, at 585. In addition, doctors have developed
reliable tests to detect sickle-cell anemia, a serious disorder that is linked to
persons of African descent. See William G. Johnson et al., Artificial Insemination by
Donors: The Need for Genetic Screening, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED. 755, 756 (1981).
32. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 153 (noting that some couples choose Al
over adoption specifically to preserve the biological link to the mother and to allow
both parents to participate in pregnancy and the birth of their child).
33. See Rice, supra note 13, at 1058-62. In fact, most documented Al cases in
the United States concern questions about the legitimacy of Al children. See id.
34. See Anita M. Hodgson, The Warranty of Sperm: A Modest Proposal to
Increase the Accountability of Sperm Banks and Physicians in the Performance of
Artificial Insemination Procedures, 26 IND. L. REV. 357, 358 (1993).
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government's failure to take action and alert policy makers
that the AI industry suffers from a lack of adequate
regulation.
1. The Skolnick Case-In 1989, Julia Skolnick brought
suit against her gynecologist, a Manhattan fertility clinic,
and a sperm bank for mistakenly inseminating her with the
sperm of an unknown donor, rather than that of her dying
husband.35 Tests revealed that the child was biracial, while
both Mrs. Skolnick and her husband were Caucasian.3 6 Addi-
tional genetic tests comparing the DNA of the child with that
found in remaining samples of Mr. Skolnick's sperm proved
that Mr. Skolnick's sperm could not have been used to con-
ceive the child.37 Although the Skolnick record was sealed
from the public,3 8 Mrs. Skolnick's physician reportedly paid a
no-fault settlement of approximately $300,000, and the sperm
bank settled for approximately $100,000. 39 Had the practices
of this gynecologist and sperm bank been regulated, this mix-
up might have been prevented.
2. The Jacobson Case-Dr. Cecil Jacobson assured his
patients that he obtained sperm from an anonymous sperm
donor bank that solicited donations from medical and semi-
nary school students.4 ° He even promised to select a donor
who would match the physical characteristics and, at times,
the religion of the recipient's mate." In 1992, Dr. Jacobson
was convicted on fifty-two counts of fraud and perjury for
inseminating up to seventy-five of his patients with his own
sperm.42 Dr. Jacobson admitted that he used his own sperm
to artificially inseminate patients at his clinic between 1976
and 1986, 43 unbeknownst to his patients and unregulated by
35. See Ronald Sullivan, Mother Accuses Sperm Bank of a Mixup, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 1990, at B1.
36. See Robin Schatz & Gale Scott, Sperm Mix-up Raises Doubts, NEWSDAY,
Mar. 10, 1990, at 4.
37. See Sullivan, supra note 35, at Bi.
38. See Ronald Sullivan, Sperm Mix-Up Lawsuit is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1,
1991, at B4.
39. See id.
40. See Robert F. Howe, For Fertility Patient, An Unrelenting Anguish, WASH.
POST, Mar. 6, 1992, at Al.
41. See Fertility Doctor Found Guilty of Fraud, Perjury, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 5,
1992, § 1, at 4.
42. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 48 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir.
1995) (citing United States v. Jacobson, No. 92-5406, (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1993), cert.
denied sub nom. Jacobson v. U.S., 511 U.S. 1069 (1994)).
43. See id. at 779 n.3.
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government authorities. Although no medical society prohib-
its AI practitioners from using their own sperm in artificial
insemination procedures, 4 Dr. Jacobson's repeated fraudu-
lent misrepresentations to his patients about the nature of
their procedures demonstrate that regulations over the AI
industry must be highly specific to minimize or prevent such
abuses.
3. The Cook Case-Joedy and Ute Cook filed charges in
1996 against a Columbus, Ohio sperm bank and a Chicago
genetic testing facility for failing to screen their donor sperm
for the cystic fibrosis gene, despite guarantees of such screen-
ing.45 The Cooks sought AI because they both carry the gene
for cystic fibrosis, and their child thus had a one in four
chance of developing the disease.46 However, the sperm bank
performed inadequate genetic tests, or none at all, and one of
the Cooks' triplets now suffers from cystic fibrosis.47
These three case studies emphasize the concerns raised by
the Curie-Cohen study and the Office of Technology Assess-
ment report, and demonstrate that sperm banks and private
physicians performing AI are not adequately regulated to
ensure patient safety. Without regulation of A! procedures,
patients like the Skolnicks and the Cooks cannot be certain
that the sperm used in their AI procedure meets minimal
safety standards, or that it is even the sperm they contracted
to use.
II. SCREENING THE AI INDUSTRY ITSELF: MEDICAL STUDIES
AND GOVERNMENT REPORTS
This Part outlines the progression of genetic screening
standards in the AI industry over the past twenty years. It
discusses in detail a 1979 study by Martin Curie-Cohen,
which demonstrated that the majority of physicians perform-
ing AI at that time failed to screen donor sperm for genetic
disorders, and those who did screen the sperm generally
44. See Dawn House, Jurors Say Infertility Doctor Guilty of Defrauding Pa-
tients, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 5, 1992, at Al.
45. See B.G. Gregg, Sperm Rules are Lax No Standard for Genetic Screening,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 23, 1996, at B1.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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lacked the knowledge and training to perform the task
adequately. 48 In response to this and similar studies, organi-
zations like the American Fertility Society and the American
Association of Tissue Banks published professional guidelines
to provide physicians and sperm banks with a minimum level
of quality for screening techniques.49 Yet the 1988 report
published by the Office of Technology Assessment illustrates
that many AI practitioners and sperm banks still failed to
comply with even these minimal screening standards.5 0 The
three cases discussed in Part .C offer clear proof of how
severely the current AI industry suffers from inadequate
regulation and illustrate why the industry is ripe for reform.
A. Curie-Cohen's 1979 Study
51
According to an influential study conducted by Martin
Curie-Cohen in 1979, Al facilities often conduct inadequate
genetic screening of donor sperm,52 indicating that significant
revamping may be necessary to best serve the interests of the
recipients and the children born from the procedure. 3 Al-
though Curie-Cohen conducted his survey nearly twenty
years ago and examined only the practices of private physi-
cians performing AI, his findings and recommendations are
still relevant to the current genetic screening practices of
physicians' and sperm banks. 4
Curie-Cohen solicited responses from 711 physicians he
deemed likely to perform AI.5' He received 379 viable re-
sponses from physicians practicing in forty-six states and the
District of Columbia." Curie-Cohen found that although 96%
48. See infra Part II.A.
49. See American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 6, at 1S.
50. See infra Part II.B.
51. See Curie-Cohen, supra note 27.
52. See id. at 589.
53. See id.
54. Cf Swanson, supra note 13, at 154-55 (citing the relevance of Curie-
Cohen's findings to continuing problems of inadequate donor record-keeping).
55. See Curie-Cohen, supra note 27, at 585 (explaining that questionnaires
were sent to physicians in the American Fertility Society listing of physicians that
perform AI, authors of recent articles on AI, and all medical school departments of
obstetrics and gynecology).
56. See id. (explaining that "viable responses" refers to responses from physi-
cians who actually performed AI).
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of the responding physicians took family medical histories,
this questioning seldom went beyond "asking a donor if any
genetic diseases existed in his family or presenting him with
a short checklist of common familial diseases."57 Because
most physicians used a select donor pool consisting predomi-
nantly of medical students, hospital residents, or other
donors with above-average health and intelligence, the physi-
cians believed that the exceptional donor pool screened out
many problematic sources.58 In addition, some of the doctors
expected the medical students and hospital residents to "self-
screen" prior to donation.59 Although many of the physicians
could list a number of genetic diseases they felt should dis-
qualify a potential donor, these physicians failed to screen
the donors adequately for these diseases.60 Rather, they con-
ducted only cursory family histories and rarely performed
biochemical tests other than blood typing.61 Furthermore, few
physicians who performed screening understood the modes of
inheriting genetic diseases.62
Curie-Cohen concluded that a need existed for increased
regulation of the genetic screening practices in the AI indus-
try.63 He recommended the compilation of a standard list of
genetic traits for which physicians should screen, coupled
with a requirement that physicians performing AI receive
adequate training to recognize genetic anomalies in donor
family histories.64 In response to this study, members of the
AI community made efforts to study and improve AI
screening standards,65 but failed to implement significant
improvements to genetic testing in the industry.66
57. See id. at 586.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 588. For example, "94.7% [of respondents] would reject a carrier
of Tay-Sachs disease, but less than 1% indicated that they tested donors for the
carrier state." Id.
61. See id. Family history inquiries may be insufficient because they rely on
both the donor's ability to recognize pertinent genetic traits in his family and his
honesty, which may be compromised by his financial incentive to donate. See id.
62. See id. Doctors did not take into account the severity of the genetic disease
or the donor's actual ability to transmit the disease to his offspring. For example,
71.4% of responding doctors reported that they would reject any donor with a family
history of hemophilia, even though a donor would be unable to pass on this X-linked
disease gene unless he was actually affected. See id.
63. See id. at 589.
64. See id.
65. See Kathleen M. Peterson, Federal Regulation of Artificial Insemination
Donor Screening Practices: An Opportunity for Law to Co-Evolve with Medicine, 96
DICK. L. REV. 59, 69-70 & n.27 (1991).
66. See id. at 70.
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B. 1988 Congressional Report on the State of
U.S. Artificial Insemination Practices
Nearly ten years after the Curie-Cohen study, the Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) commissioned a follow-up
study to assess the state of AI screening practices of physi-
cians and sperm banks.67 The 1988 OTA report documented
that while genetic testing in some areas of the AI industry
responded to the concerns published in Curie-Cohen's 1979
study, the AI industry as a whole manifested great inconsis-
tency in its testing procedures.6 8 The study revealed that
sperm banks generally comply with professional guidelines
such as those published by the American Association of
Tissue Banks and the American Fertility Society.69 However,
the nature and extent of the tests varied,7" and few sperm
banks performed chromosomal tests for genetic diseases.7 '
Most smaller clinics and private physicians also failed to
screen donors for genetic defects or diseases prior to accept-
ing them.72 The report concluded that most physicians and
sperm banks favor the establishment of national standards
73
(either voluntary or mandatory) for donor screening.74 This
report underscored the continuing need for increased regula-
tion of AI screening practices. As Part III will demonstrate,
the current federal, state, and industry regulation of AI is
67. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 3.
68. See id. at 33-40 (discussing donor selection and screening by physicians
performing AI); id. at 66-70 (discussing donor selection and screening by sperm
banks).
69. See id. at 71.
70. See id. at 67.
71. See id. at 67, tbls. 3-5. All of the facilities participating in the study
required a donor's personal and family medical history, in addition to his genetic
history. Most facilities also required a donor's fertility history, a physical
examination, and a personality assessment. See id. at 67. Rather than performing
chromosomal tests for such autosomal recessive diseases such as Tay-Sachs, sickle
cell anemia, and thalassemia, most donor facilities simply reject any donor with a
family history of diseases. See id. at 68, tbls. 3-6, 69-70.
72. See id. at 33. Only 20% of physicians who regularly performed artificial
insemination by donor stated "that a family history of genetic disease would lead
them to require genetic screening of a potential donor." Id. at 35.
73. See id. at 10-11 (noting that 80% favor national standards for donor screen-
ing by sperm banks, and that 68% favor such standards for screening by private
practitioners).
74. See id. at 72.
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inadequate and in need of reform in order to ensure the
safety of future AI recipients and their children.
III. CURRENT FEDERAL, STATE, AND INDUSTRY REGULATION
OF ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Despite the OTA's exposure of the substandard health and
safety practices in the AI industry, neither the federal nor
the state governments have introduced any significant legis-
lation creating universal genetic screening procedures for
donor sperm. 5 Groups such as the American Fertility Society
and the American Association of Tissue Banks have pub-
lished guidelines for testing donor semen. 6 However, these
guidelines contain only recommendations for AI practitioners,
who remain self-regulating in most states, and who follow a
wide variety of screening procedures." This Part discusses
the inadequacies of the current industry, state, and federal
regulation of AI practices. Only with federal regulation of AI
screening procedures can a universal standard of care devel-
op in the AI industry that will best accommodate the inter-
ests of AI recipients, donors, and children.
A. The American Fertility Society's 1990 Guidelines
For the Use of Semen Donor Insemination
In 1990, in response to the increase in documented cases of
AI and to heightened concern about the transmission of dis-
ease through inadequately screened donor samples,78 the
American Fertility Society (AFS) revised its guidelines for the
use of donor semen. s The 1990 guidelines list two central
features in the selection of AI donors: "(1) assurance of good
health status and (2) absence of genetic abnormalities."80
75. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 61-62.
76. See, e.g., American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 6.
77. See Cheryl L. Meyer, Transmission of HIV Through Donor Semen, 15
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 115, 118 (1993-94).
78. See American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 6, at 1S.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2S.
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Thus, the AFS has recognized the importance of careful donor
selection to curtail the spread of genetic disease.
The guidelines recommend the use of "state-of-the-art
tests"81 to screen for genetic disorders, including nontrivial
malformations of complex causes, such as cleft palate, spina
bifida, or congential heart malformation; nontrivial Mende-
lian disorders, such as albinism or hemophilia; familial dis-
eases with genetic components, such as asthma, juvenile
diabetes, epilepsy, or psychosis; autosomal recessive diseases,
such as cystic fibrosis or Tay-Sachs disease; and chromosomal
rearrangements. 2 The guidelines also recommend that the
practitioner should screen for these disorders in the donor,83
and in his first-degree relatives (parents or offspring) using
donor questionnaires.84 The AFS does not require a complete
chromosomal analysis of donors when a thorough genetic
history indicates little probability of ethnically linked genetic
diseases.85 The AFS recommends that physicians who pur-
chase samples from commercial sperm bankss should take
care to obtain sufficient donor and semen quality information
consistent with the guidelines before using the samples.86
Although the AFS has outlined minimum standards for the
genetic screening of sperm donors, compliance by AI practi-
tioners is purely voluntary.87 Thus, without proper monitor-
ing of AI facilities to enforce compliance, the AFS guidelines
are unlikely to significantly increase the safety of the sperm
donor pool.
81. Id. at 8S. However, in contrast to a detailed description of laboratory
screening methods for sexually transmitted diseases and other infectious diseases,
see id. at 35, the guidelines do not elaborate on methods for genetic screening,
leaving individual practitioners to implement various screening procedures. For
example, the guidelines suggest that Al practitioners obtain a "proper family
history" of all donors, but fail to discuss any techniques that will ensure accurate
disclosure of information. See id. at 3S. Although advanced methods of genetic
screening might include expanded use of chromosomal analysis, the guidelines
specifically state that this procedure is not necessary under all circumstances. See
id. at 3S. Thus, the AFS falls short of providing substantive guidance to reduce the
disparities in genetic screening and the incidences of genetic disorders in Al.
82. See id. at 8S.
83. See id. at 3S.
84. See id. at 8S-9S.
85. See id. at 3S.
86. See id.
87. Cf Meyer, supra note 77, at 118 (noting that, despite the AFS guidelines,
most sperm banks, hospitals, and practitioners are self-regulating and follow a
variety of screening procedures).
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B. State Regulation of Artificial Insemination
Although a number of states have enacted statutes requir-
ing that AI be performed by, or under the supervision of, a
licensed physician, 8 few states regulate sperm donation
screening. 9 Some states have enacted laws mandating
screening for other conditions beyond that usually done for
the HIV virus and other infectious diseases, but these laws
do not specifically provide for genetic testing.90 Ohio man-
dates genetic testing for non-spousal AI, but leaves to the
discretion of the physician the choice of screening
procedures. 91 Delaware and Illinois require sperm banks to
register with the state Department of Public Health.92
However, in the absence of provisions requiring disclosure
about the screening methods actually used, patients remain
uninformed about the potential inadequacy of donor
screening procedures. 93 Largely self-regulated, doctors and
sperm banks in the majority of states view additional
biological or genetic screening as purely optional.
Furthermore, they are rarely held liable for their failure to
perform additional tests "if the donation of contaminated or
88. See Lorio, supra note 29, at 1649 (citing, inter alia, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 45a-772 (West 1993) (requiring AI to be performed only by persons certified to
practice medicine in the state); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-34-42 (1994) (stating that only
licensed physicians and surgeons may administer or perform AI); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 3111.30, .32 (Anderson 1996) (allowing AI to be performed only by or under
supervision of licensed physicians); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 553 (West 1987)
(stating that only persons licensed to practice medicine in the state may perform
AI); OR. REV. STAT. § 677.360 (1995) (allowing only licensed physicians and persons
under their supervision to perform AI)).
89. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801(a) (1995) (mandating testing for
HIV); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:10 (1997) (requiring documented medical
evaluation demonstrating "medical acceptability" of donor); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3111.33 (Anderson 1996) (requiring medical history, examination, and laboratory
tests of non-spousal donors).
90. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1644.5 (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 2801(b) (1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 381.0041 (1993); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
2310/55.46 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-41-14-5 (West 1996).
91. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.33(B)(2)(b) (Anderson 1996) (requiring that
physicians conduct "appropriate" laboratory studies, including but not limited to,
karyotyping, Tay-Sachs, and sickle cell anemia).
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2801(a) (mandating registration and establish-
ing a fine for noncompliance); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2310/55.46(a) (West 1993)
(same).
93. See Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 623, 634 (1991).
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defective sperm results in the birth or abortion of genetically
defective or diseased offspring."94
The variations in regulation of sperm banks and donor
screening from state to state prevent AI recipients from being
assured of the safety of the AI procedure. For the protection
of Al recipients, the federal government should establish
uniform regulation and should monitor the Al industry.
C. Federal Regulation of Artificial Insemination
Despite then-Senator Al Gore's promise in 1988 to "take
appropriate action" if the FDA failed to strengthen regulation
of the screening and testing practices in the AI industry, 5
the federal government has not enacted any legislation that
addresses genetic testing of donor semen.
The federal government appeared to be making some prog-
ress toward fulfilling Gore's vision with the following entry in
the 1993 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.):
FDA is proposing regulations intended to prevent the
transmission of communicable disease through the use of
human semen for artificial insemination. The proposed
regulations would provide for the registration with FDA
of establishments collecting, manufacturing, and distrib-
uting semen intended for artificial insemination. Regis-
tered facilities would be required to meet standards
intended to ensure that semen donors are appropriately
screened and tested, that the collected semen is not
contaminated with an agent of communicable disease
through errors of poor practices, and that records are kept
documenting that the appropriate procedures have been
followed. Registered facilities meeting these standards
would receive a certification from FDA that would permit
the continued distribution of semen intended for artificial
insemination. Human semen collected from a donor who
is the spouse or other sexually intimate partner of the
intended recipient would not fall under the scope of the
proposed regulation.9"
94. Hodgson, supra note 34, at 363.
95. Marwick, supra note 9, at 1339.
96. Human Semen for Artificial Insemination, 21 C.F.R. § 1260 (1993) (empha-
sis added).
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Unfortunately, this C.F.R. entry included neither a legal
deadline nor timetable for action, nor did it address the need
to screen for genetic diseases.97 The corresponding C.F.R.
entry in 1994 disclosed no plans to implement this regulation
within the following twelve months.9 The federal government
has taken no further steps toward the national regulation of
the AI industry, leaving regulation to either the individual
states or the AI practitioners themselves.99
IV. SOLVING THE PROBLEM
The artificial insemination industry affects enough people
to merit closer control. 100 Because of the private nature of the
industry, however, AI practitioners do not effectively police
themselves.' Physicians with various specialities perform AI
as a subset of their practice, 10 2 making it difficult to monitor
involvement in the industry. Further, the sparse regulation
of sperm banks precludes a nationwide count of the number
of banks in operation,0 3 and allows "sperm banks and labora-
tories [to] operate free of any official oversight."0 4
This Part proposes that the federal government should
establish a national system of cooperative sperm donation
facilities spread throughout the country.'0 5 Each donation
facility should register with, and be monitored by, the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to provide the
regulation and enforcement that the current AI industry
97. See id.
98. See Human Semen for Artificial Insemination, 21 C.F.R. § 1260 (1994).
99. See Cork, supra note 7, at 1550-51 (noting that Congress has been slow in
its response to problems in the AI industry); Peterson, supra note 65, at 61-62
(noting the lack of response by the federal government to requests for regulation of
the Al industry).
100. Cf Cork, supra note 7, at 1536 (reporting that 40,000 patients receive
"assisted reproductive treatment" annually).
101. See Cork, supra note 7, at 1537.
102. Cf INFERTILITY CHOICES, supra note 4, at 6 (reporting that infertility treat-
ment may be obtained from obstetrician-gynecologists, general or family practitio-
ners, urologists, and surgeons).
103. See Cork, supra note 7, at 1540-41 & n.31 (noting that estimates of the
number of sperm banks in the U.S. vary from 400 to 1,100).
104. Id. at 1541.
105. See infra Part IV.B.
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lacks.10 6 The FDA, with the assistance of the AFS and private
physicians, should establish and continually update concrete
nationwide donor screening regulations for sperm banks.
1 7
Finally, the sperm donor system should require that AI prac-
titioners keep better records of Al procedures and disclose
non-identifying donor information to AI recipients and their
children.
0 8
A. Federal Regulation of a National Sperm Donor System
Although matters of medical practice and family law fall
within the traditional bounds of state responsibility, 10 9 estab-
lishing a national sperm donor system under the control of
the FDA would universalize the testing procedures of donor
sperm and potentially reduce the number of genetic diseases
perpetuated by the transmission of unscreened sperm. 10 The
Constitution does not speak directly to issues of medical care
or human reproduction, but the federal government derives
the power to regulate interstate public health through the
authority granted by the Commerce Clause."'
The FDA could derive its authority to regulate the testing
procedures of sperm banks from several sources." 2 First,
within its Center for Devices and Radiological Health, the
FDA has the power "to regulate tissues, including semen." 3
Furthermore, under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the
FDA has the authority to establish standards for biological
products." 4 The definition of "biological product"-any "virus,
therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin or analogous product
applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or
106. See Meyer, supra note 77, at 121 (discussing problems resulting from lack
of federal regulation).
107. See infra Part IV.C.
108. See infra Part IV.D.
109. See INFERTILITY CHOICES, supra note 4, at 10.
110. See id. at 176.
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Peterson, supra note 65, at 86-87 (arguing
that the taxing, spending and commerce powers supply the federal government with
regulatory authority over health care).
112. See generally INFERTILITY CHOICES, supra note 4, at 176-83 (discussing
grounds for federal authority to regulate infertility treatment and research).
113. Id. at 24.
114. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 88 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 610 (1989) as the
basis of FDA authority over biological products).
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injuries of man"'l-could easily include donor semen,
particularly in light of the elaborate process of collection,
preservation and storage. 116 Because many couples seek AI as
a result of infertility or medical problems that impede
natural reproduction,"1 7 they arguably are seeking treatment
to cure infertility disease. In addition, the straws of donor
semen purchased by these couples serve as an integral part
of the AI procedure, and thus are an essential part of the
"treatment" of infertility disease." 8 Thus, the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act provides the FDA with the requisite
authority to regulate the standards of the donor semen used
in a national sperm donor system.
Even though the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion reserves to the state governments the power to protect
the health and safety of the public,"19 the states are not well
suited to provide the universal regulation necessary to guar-
antee the safety of the AI industry. 2 ° Each state government
retains the power to legislate, or not to legislate, testing
requirements for donor sperm.' 2' Because AI practitioners
often import donor sperm from sperm banks in other states
which may not regulate adequately the screening of donor
sperm, an AI recipient cannot be certain, absent national
regulatory standards, that the sperm she uses meets the
screening requirements of the state in which she purchased
it. 12 2 Even if a state guaranteed higher standards of sperm
donor genetic testing, an AI clinic in that state might
purchase samples from a sperm bank in a non-regulated
state because such samples can be purchased at a reduced
cost. 123 Furthermore, without federal regulation of the AI
115. 21 C.F.R. § 600.3(h) (1989) (emphasis added).
116. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 88 & n.50 (describing the process utilized by
larger semen donation facilities).
117. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 23 (reporting that 8
out of 10 requests for AI are the result of male infertility); Curie-Cohen, supra note
27, at 585 (reporting that male infertility accounts for over 95% of requests for AI);
Peterson, supra note 65, at 59 (reporting-the popularity of AI as a treatment for
male infertility).
118. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 88.
119. See INFERTILITY CHOICES, supra note 4, at 172 (interpreting "police power" to
include governmental power to protect health, safety, and morals of citizens).
120. See discussion supra Part III.B.
121. See INFERTILITY CHOICES, supra note 4, at 172-76 (discussing methods by
which states may regulate infertility treatment).
122. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 82-83.
123. See id.
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industry, this Note's proposal for a cooperative network of
sperm donor centers 124 would not be feasible. Thus, federal
regulation of the AI industry is preferable to state-by-state
regulation to achieve the uniformity of health and safety
standards needed in the AI industry.
Common law litigation is also an inadequate enforcement
mechanism, as it deals retrospectively with the injuries of
individual parties. The result is ad-hoc policy created by state
courts in response to case-specific disputes. 125 Such piecemeal
litigation, like state-by-state regulation, fails to adequately
deter abuses in the AI industry.
In contrast, government regulation acts prospectively to
anticipate potential problems and create a coherent public
policy that prevents people from suffering unnecessary injury
as a result of AL. 12' The federal government is in a better
position than state governments to promulgate the uniform
regulation necessary to ensure safe and effective practice of
AL. 12
7
B. National System of Sperm Donor Centers
In general, larger commercial sperm banks have adopted
the AFS donor screening guidelines, 121 while an unknown
number of small, private sperm banks operate without
license from any state, registration with an organization, or
governmental oversight. 29 The proposed national donor
system would restrict donations to an established network
of donor centers spread throughout the country. 30 Potential
AI recipients still would be able to seek reproductive
treatment from private physicians; however, these phy-
sicians would be required to obtain donor samples from one
124. See infra Part IV.B.
125. See Cork, supra note 7, at 1537.
126. Cf Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation: Unscram-
bling the Conundrum of Legal Maturity, 80 IOWA L. REv. 265, 267 (1995) (asserting
this position with regard to the egg donation industry).
127. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 92.
128. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 71.
129. See Cork, supra note 7, at 1541.
130. But cf Peterson, supra note 65, at 91 (recommending a broadly inclusive
definition of semen donation facility).
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of the FDA-monitored donor centers.' 1 By limiting the
sources for donor sperm to official sperm banks registered
with the FDA, donor sperm would more likely receive the
screening necessary to ensure its safety. This system would
establish a universal standard of care for AI practitioners
that is lacking in the current system of donor screening.
Critics of a national sperm donor bank system have argued
that "the legislative process is too slow and enforcement too
rare to provide the needed swift, effective solution" to the
problems of the current AI industry. 132 They have also argued
that the Center for Disease Control should issue recommen-
dations that emphasize the need to take comprehensive
genetic histories of sperm donors and their families.133
However, this does not explain how these CDC
recommendations will promote greater compliance than the
recommendations released by the AFS. As in the case of the
AFS, the CDC would issue only recommendations and would
have no enforcement mechanism or authority to police
compliance with these recommendations. The problems
stemming from the current practice of self-regulation in the
AI industry are not likely to disappear as long as
practitioners are permitted. 34
Critics have also argued that Congress will have a difficult
time passing any legislation because of the stigma associated
with donor insemination. 135 However, with over 11,000 pri-
vate physicians performing AI nationwide, 36 and with more
permissive social attitudes toward alternative forms of the
American family unit,'37 this multimillion dollar industry no
longer faces an overwhelming social stigma. 138
131. This restriction would not apply to recipients who have selected their own
donor. This system only applies to artificial insemination by anonymous donors.
132. Hodgson, supra note 34, at 360.
133. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 90.
134. See supra Part II.
135. See Hodgson, supra note 34, at n.13 (citing Rice, supra note 13, at 1073 &
n.197). In the past, some lower courts have held that AI constituted adultery. See,
e.g., Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Ill. Super. Ct. 1954) (holding that AI
was "contrary to public policy and good morals" and constitutes adultery on the part
of the mother). In addition, some courts discussed the illegitimacy of children born
by AL. See, e.g., id. (holding that a husband's consent to the procedure would not
legitimize a child born by Al); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 410 (Sup. Ct.
1963) (holding that the legislature's failure to pass a statute legitimizing children
born by Al demonstrated an intent to exclude these children from legitimacy).
136. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 8.
137. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 170.
138. See SNOWDEN & MITCHELL, supra note 24, at 15 ("The climate of public
opinion on questions of sexual behaviour has undergone a considerable change and
AID, though still a controversial subject, is now looked upon with less reluctance by
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In creating a national sperm donor system, the FDA might
seek guidance from other countries, including the French
CECOS Federation, which regulates twenty AI treatment
centers across France."3 9 The French system boasts extensive
collaboration between the centers on both practical and ethi-
cal issues, providing a forum for collective discussion and
preparation of long-term strategies in the field of A. 4 ° Not
only does this collaboration facilitate comparisons of different
artificial reproductive procedures and their results, but it
also allows for the establishment of permanent advisory
groups and the adoption of universal practices that provide
security to AI recipients.' Although the United States sys-
tem should not duplicate the French system-the FDA must
take into account the differences between the French and
U.S. social and economic environments' 42 -the CECOS Feder-
ation demonstrates that a national sperm donor bank system
is a potential solution to the problems currently plaguing the
American AI industry.
C. Heightened Standards of Genetic Screening
The proposed national donor system would require that all
sperm samples undergo strict viral, bacterial, and genetic
screening before they are released for AI treatments. The
1990 AFS guidelines would provide the absolute minimum
threshold for donor screening. However, physicians involved
with artificial insemination, genetics, and epidemiology
should collaborate with the FDA and the AFS to determine
whether the 1990 guidelines require supplementation, 14 and
should reexamine annually the adopted FDA guidelines to
incorporate medical advancements affecting AI screening.
both the medical profession and the general public.'). Note, however, that many
major religions continue to oppose Al. See discussion infra note 180.
139. See Pierre Jalbert et al., Genetic Aspects of Artificial Insemination With
Donor Semen: The French CECOS Federation Guidelines, 33 AM. J. MED. GENETICS
269, 269 (1989). In addition, Australia contains 12 regional sperm donor centers.
See Terra Ziporyn, 'Artificial" Human Reproduction Poses Medical, Social Concerns,
255 JAMA 13, 13 (1986).
140. See Jalbert, supra note 139, at 273.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 269.
143. See Marwick, supra note 9, at 1339.
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Fertility experts are divided on whether to require chromo-
somal testing of donor sperm to screen for genetic disease. 144
The 1990 AFS guidelines note that "[it would be impractical
to screen donors for all deleterious recessive diseases detect-
able in a heterozygote state, but it would be desirable to
screen them for mutant genes at high frequency in their own
ethnic population." 4 5 Participants in the FDA donor system
should not be required to perform chromosomal tests for all
known genetic disease genes, due to the high cost of such
testing.'46 Rather, the sperm banks should examine carefully
the donor's medical and family histories to determine the
genetic diseases for which he is most at risk.147 Then, rather
than screening out all at-risk donors, as is the current prac-
tice at many sperm banks, 41 the sperm banks should perform
chromosomal tests to determine whether the individual donor
carries the disease gene. 149 By carefully conducting medical
history inquiries and selectively using genetic screening
tests, the national donor system could prevent the unneces-
sary rejection of acceptable potential donors while still ex-
cluding sperm carrying genetic disorders.
Critics of widespread genetic testing of sperm donors state
that because "'normal' couples don't generally undergo
genetic testing before conception," 5 ° and genetic tests cannot
screen for 100% of all genetic mutations for a single
disease,' sperm banks should not be required to guarantee
safety and perfect conception results. 5 2 Many couples, howev-
er, do undergo genetic testing prior to natural conception. 153
Furthermore, those couples who seek AI for genetic reasons
144. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 78 & n.200 (comparing and contrasting
authorities on issue of mandatory genetic testing of donors).
145. American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 6, at 8S.
146. See Ziporyn, supra note 139, at 14.
147. See id. at 85-95.
148. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 69-70.
149. See American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 6, at 8S.
150. Ziporyn, supra note 139, at 14.
151. See Gregg, supra note 45, at B1.
152. See Ziporyn, supra note 136, at 13-14 (discussing criticism of mandatory
donor screening).
153. See Genetic Testing and Assessment, in ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICA-
TIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 59, 75 (Lori B. Andrews et al. eds., 1994)
(discussing frequency of genetic testing for older couples and those who have a
family history of genetic disease) [hereinafter Genetic Testing]. In fact, the Ameri-
can College of Obstetrics and Gynecology believes that offering prenatal genetic
testing is part of the medical "standard of care" for pregnant women over the age of
35. Id.
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expect the highest quality spermatozoa from sperm banks.11
4
Since the malpractice liability of AI practitioners remains
unclear,'55 "more stringent and uniform medical and genetic
testing is especially important."5 6
A further argument against more exhaustive genetic test-
ing requirements for sperm donor banks is that furnishing
in-depth genetic tests will be too costly, adding $500 to $1000
to the cost of artificial insemination." 7 Yet couples such as
the Cooks, 5 ' who have already invested a large sum of mon-
ey in prior reproductive tests or treatments, 5 9 may be willing
to pay an additional amount to reduce the risk that their
child will be born with a serious genetic disease. 6 °
Members of the AI community fear that heightened stan-
dards for the genetic testing of sperm donors will severely
deplete the donor pool. 6 ' Each person carries between three
and five lethal recessive genes, and, therefore, may carry
some deleterious genetic disease gene.6 2 In light of the fact
that more than 2,000 genetic diseases exist,6 3 such "highly
detailed screening would ultimately result in the exclusion of
such a high proportion of donors as to preclude any recruit-
ment."64 On the other hand, the failure to implement proper
genetic testing also may needlessly eliminate many potential
donors. Sperm banks often automatically reject several cate-
gories of donors, such as members of certain ethnic groups,
homosexuals, and drug users.'6 5 Therefore, to reduce the risk
of discrimination in donor selection,6 6 donor banks should
determine whether the donor himself poses a risk of HIV or
154. See Ziporyn, supra note 139, at 14.
155. See Frankel, supra note 19, at 305; Ziporyn, supra note 136, at 14.
156. Frankel, supra note 19, at 298.
157. See Lorio, supra note 29, at n.51 (discussing estimated costs in 1984).
158. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
159. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 48. The cost of artifi-
cial insemination varies with each recipient, depending on her medical condition
and the number of inseminations required for conception. At the time of the 1987
OTA Report, most women spent an average of $309 for pre-insemination treat-
ments, and an additional $93 for each of seven insemination treatments. See id.
160. See Ziporyn, supra note 139, at 14.
161. See Jalbert, supra note 139, at 271.
162. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 89-90; Jalbert, supra note 139, at 271; see
also Genetic Testing, supra note 153, at 70-71 (discussing the likelihood that an
individual carries a gene for a genetic disorder).
163. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 90.
164. Jalbert, supra note 139, at 271.
165. See ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION, supra note 20, at 35-37.
166. See Peterson, supra note 65, at 90.
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genetic disease, using only those genetic tests deemed to be
necessary after an evaluation of the donor's medical, family
and genetic history.
67
Furthermore, even if a donor tests positive for certain
genetic disease genes, he should not be rejected automatical-
ly. The French CECOS Federation genetic screening proce-
dures are designed to eliminate "only the most frequent and
most severe genetic defects."'68 When certain donors test
positive for genetic disease genes that do not constitute a
substantial risk unless they are present in both the donor
and the recipient (recessive disease genes), the French
CECOS centers place these donors in a separate pool and
pair them only with women who lack the corresponding re-
cessive gene. 169 Thus, genetic screening actually opens up the
donor pool by breaking the general pool into smaller, gene-
based pools, thereby avoiding automatic rejection of many
donors, including those with recessive disease genes.
The proposed national donor system will take this idea one
step further, eventually segregating donor centers by genetic
disease, with each center testing solely for one specific dis-
ease.'7 This restructuring would cut the cost of genetic test-
ing significantly, because the donor centers would not be
expected to test for every genetic disease.' 7 ' Thus, a recipient
who seeks AI because she has a gene for cystic fibrosis will
purchase sperm from a cystic fibrosis testing center. She does
not need to incur extra costs for additional genetic tests
unless she chooses to solicit these tests on a fee-for-service
basis. The FDA system could retain several centers that do
167. Cf Jalbert, supra note 139, at 273 (recommending that donor evaluations
be conducted by physicians trained in genetic counseling to avoid unnecessary
rejection of donors); Peterson, supra note 65, at 90 (same).
168. Jalbert, supra note 139, at 271. Such defects include severe dominant condi-
tions, chromosomal abnormalities, confirmed heterozygosity for an autosomal
recessive disease, and perhaps even probable heterozygosity for common and serious
conditions, such as cystic fibrosis. See id.
169. See id.
170. The FDA would only establish testing centers for the most commonly tested
diseases, such as cystic fibrosis, diabetes, hemophilia, Huntington's disease, muscu-
lar dystrophy, and Tay-Sachs disease, identified by Curie-Cohen, supra note 27, at
585, as the diseases most frequently cited by couples seeking AI for genetic reasons.
However, the FDA advisory group should examine medical trends to determine
whether this list accurately reflects the needs of the Al community and innovations
in genetic technology.
171. See generally Ziporyn, supra note 139, at 14 (discussing costs, in 1986, of
genetic testing of donors).
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not perform specialized genetic chromosome testing for those
recipients who are not concerned with genetic screening.
These centers nonetheless would be required to take rigorous
genetic histories of all donors.
Because the sperm donor centers would function as a coop-
erative unit under this proposed system, the FDA could
transport sperm samples from state to state as needed. The
AFS guidelines limit donor use to ten pregnancies to reduce
the chance that two half-siblings will unwittingly marry.'72
Under this cooperative structure, the FDA may be able to
increase the number of pregnancies permitted per donor,
because the FDA could dilute the donor pool by dispersing
samples from each individual to donor centers in different
parts of the country. Permitting greater use of each donor not
only increases the number of available sperm samples, but
also makes heightened donor screening more economically
feasible.
D. More Relaxed Standards for the Disclosure of
Non-identifying Donor Information
Even with more rigorous genetic testing standards, the
proposed sperm donor system will not guarantee that every
child born from AI would be free from disease, genetic or
otherwise.'73 Therefore, it is important to the well-being of
both AI recipients and their offspring that donor facilities
and practitioners allow them to trace their respective genetic
and medical histories.'74 The proposed FDA-regulated system
must establish a better flow of information between AI do-
nors, couples, and children by requiring AI practitioners to
maintain better records of the procedure, and by requiring
the release of any non-identifying information that the FDA
deems appropriate. Historically, complete confidentiality has
172. See American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 6, at 4S.
173. Cf Peterson, supra note 65, at 92 (concluding that federal regulation is
likely to reduce significantly the spread of disease). Scientists have not found
genetic links for most disorders, and cannot prevent most congenital abnormalities.
See Genetic Testing, supra note 153, at 80.
174. See generally Swanson, supra note 13, at 184-90 (recommending legislation
for record-keeping in the Al industry).
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been considered an "important requisite" to the donor insemi-
nation procedure.'75 As one clinician has explained:
It is our practice to destroy all records after 1 year to
ensure confidentiality and to prevent either the donor
seeking out any resultant offspring or the reverse. Be-
cause only donors with a negative medical and genetic
history are used, we feel that providing medical data
about them is unnecessary. Furthermore, we believe that
anonymity is one of the most important requisites of this
procedure.76
According to Curie-Cohen's study on AI practices, 77 only
36.9% of responding doctors maintained any records on chil-
dren born by AI, and even a smaller percentage of doctors
(30.4%) kept records on the donors. 78 This resistance to dis-
closure may have stemmed either from the fear that donors
would be held financially responsible for the children born by
AI,171 or from the opposition to AI expressed by many major
religions. 8 ' Yet many state statutes have eliminated the
threat of the donor's financial responsibility by mandating
that a child born by AI should be deemed the natural child of
the AI recipient and her husband and not of the donor.' 8'
1. Concerns about donor-recipient anonymity-A survey
by the AI Research Project determined that doctors, rather
than AI couples, show the most concern about maintaining
anonymity in the AI process.8 2 The donors themselves are
more willing to provide personal information to doctors, AI
175. Andrews & Douglass, supra note 93, at 659; see Swanson, supra note 13, at
154-55 (discussing historical practice of donor anonymity).
176. Randall A. Loy& Machelle M. Seibel, Therapeutic Insemination, in INFERTILI-
TY: A COMPREHENsIvE TEXT 199, 208 (Machelle M. Seibel ed., 1990).
177. See supra Part II.A.
178. See Curie-Cohen, supra note 27, at 588.
179. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 93, at 660.
180. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 164-68. The Catholic Church, the Eastern
Orthodox Church, many denominations of Protestantism, the Episcopal Church,
many branches of the Evangelical and Baptist Churches, Judaism, and Islam have
expressed opposition to Al. See id.
181. See id. at 162 (discussing the Uniform Parentage Act, which, as of 1993,
had been adopted by 18 states).
182. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE 53-54 (1985); see also Swanson,
supra note 13, at 171-73 (discussing physicians' concern about maintaining donor
anonymity); Ziporyn, supra note 139, at 14 (same).
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couples, and AI children than previously believed.18 3 Under
the proposed FDA regulated system, physician-patient confi-
dentiality would require the AI practitioner to restrict access
so that only the parties involved in the procedure could ob-
tain the medical records. 84 In addition, donors and recipient
couples who wish to protect their privacy could instruct the
AI practitioner to restrict access to any identifying informa-
tion absent any medical emergency that would necessitate
limited disclosure.'85 Therefore, the interchange of non-
identifying information about donors, recipient couples, and
AI offspring would create few conflicts of interest among AI
participants.
2. Interests served by the release of non-identifying AI
records-The release of non-identifying information serves
several important interests of the AI donor and child, and of
the medical community itself. First of all, children born by AI
have an interest in learning about their family medical histo-
ries. i 6 Doctors use this information to advise their patients
on their risks of developing certain diseases, and whether
patients should alter their behavior to prevent certain health
problems."8 7 In addition, disclosing this information may
reveal the identity of a relative who can provide a suitable
match for lifesaving transplant procedures.'88
Both AI donors and children also have a parallel interest in
the release of any genetic information that would enable
them to prevent future children from developing genetic
disease. If the donor unknowingly passes a disease gene to
his AI offspring, he should be notified so he can make
183. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 171. Ninety percent of donors surveyed
allowed physicians to record extensive information about their medical, social,
educational, and personal histories. Further, 96% of this sample agreed to release
this non-identifying information to the recipient couple and resultant child, and
60% allowed disclosure of their identity to the child when he or she reaches the age
of majority. Only 29% of the donors required anonymity, while 36% agreed to
donate sperm, regardless of any guarantee of anonymity. See id. at 171 &
nn.135-41.
184. See id. at 186-90. Access to the records should be determined on the basis
of "the person requesting it, the substance of the information sought, and the
reasons for which the requesting person asks for it." Id. at 187.
185. See id. at 187, 189. A medical emergency, such as the need for a bone
marrow or organ transplant, may necessitate limited disclosure of identifying
information. See id. at 174.
186. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 174.
187. See id,
188. See id. at 175.
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educated genetic choices about his future procreation. 9 The
AI child also needs to know his or her complete genetic histo-
ry in order to make informed reproductive choices.' 9° He or
she may marry accidentally a half-sibling, or, if the AI child
is female, she may marry her own biological father.' 9 ' Final-
ly, without proper record keeping and follow-up of AI proce-
dures, the FDA and AI practitioners cannot track the success
of the current donor system, or propose changes to provide
better protection for future treatments. 92 It is important to
ensure the privacy of AI donors, recipients, and children; yet
these privacy interests must be weighed against the numer-
ous interests served by heightened documentation and disclo-
sure.
One of the most important aspects of a regulated sperm
donor system is the full disclosure of all medical information,
whether from AI recipient to physician or from potential
donor to sperm bank. Increasing the flow of medical informa-
tion from biological child to biological parent, and vice versa,
is consistent with this spirit of disclosure and will help to
ensure that the AI system is as safe as possible for all in-
volved parties.
CONCLUSION
The current system of artificial insemination by donor is
plagued with problems caused by the lack of universal
regulation, insufficient donor screening techniques for both
contagious and genetic disease, inadequate record-keeping
procedures, and disclosure requirements that fail to reflect
the interests of the parties involved. Continued self-
regulation of procedures by AI practitioners will jeopardize
the integrity of this multi-million dollar industry by failing to
provide sufficient medical protection for AI donors, recipients,
or the children born from the procedure.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 177.
191. Id. at 177. To decrease the likelihood of incest, the AFS has recommended
limiting each donor to 10 successful inseminations, and less than 10 if donation use
is concentrated in an isolated subgroup. See American Fertility Soc'y, supra note 6,
at 4S.
192. See Swanson, supra note 13, at 182.
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By implementing a national sperm donor system regulated
by the FDA, Congress could ensure that all individuals who
seek AI would know that the donor sperm samples they re-
ceive have met rigorous biological and genetic screening
standards, regardless of the state or setting in which they
undergo the procedure. The United States Supreme Court
has ruled that the right to procreate is "fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race."193 Congress should
take steps to ensure that individuals are also guaranteed the
right to procreate safely, no matter which method of repro-
duction they choose.
193. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

